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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the matter of the
Adoption of
PETER KELLY McKINSTRAY and
MELODY DAWN McKINSTRAY,

Case No. 17035

Minors.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action seeking a determination that

th~

Appellant, Dale R. McKinstray, has abandoned his natural
children Peter Kelly McKinstray and Melody Dawn McKinstray
and that he should therefore be deprived of all parental
rights and responsibilities arising from his fatherhood and
that the petition for adoption by the children's step-father
should be granted without the consent of the Appellant.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court, Hon. David B. Dee,
Judge, heard this matter without jury and adjudged that the
Appellant natural father has abandoned his two natural
children, that Appellant be deprived of all parental rights
of every kind regarding his children, and that the adoption
sought by the petitioners in this matter, the children's
natural mother and step-father, proceed without the consent
of the children's natural father.
In a post-judgment motion the Appellant sought amendment
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sought the taking of

addi~ional

testimony in behalf of

Appellant, or in the alternative sought a new trial, all
of which were denied by the trial court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks first a remand to the trial court for
the taking of addition testimony as prayed in Appellant's
post-trial motion and for the amendment of the Findings of
Fact particularly as would relate to the credibility of
witnesses appearing.

Appellant further seeks a reversal of

the judgment of the court below such that Appellant not be
adjudged to have abandoned his children and that he has
the rights and.responsibilities attendant to his status as
the non-custodial natural father of the children.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The natural parents of the children involved in this
action, Dale R. McKinstray and Nadine Ann McKinstray Suesserman, were married in 1965, had born as issue of their marriage
Peter (b. Feb. 28, 1968) and Melody (b. Aug. 15, 1967), and
were divorced January 6, 1970 (R. · 5; Exhibit 1).

Nadine

subsequently married Irwin Raymond Suesserman (R. 5).
Under the terms of the McKinstray divorce (R. 7-9; Exhibit 1),
custody of the children was granted to their mother "subject
to the right of reasonable visitation at reasonable times and
places by the [Appellant] Dale R. McKinstray including the
right to have said minor children visit with him at reasonable
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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8). Act, administered
Mr. McKinstray
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obligation of support for the children on a graduated basis,
i.e., $30 per month per child for the year 1970, $35 per
month per child for 1971, $40 per month per child for 1972,
$45 per month per child for 1973, adn $50 per month per child
for all years thereafter (R. 8-9) .
From late 1972 until February, 1973, the children
and their mother lived in California (Trans. 9).

Mr. Mc-

Kinstray did not know their location until just before they
moved (Exhibit 7), which turned out to be to Jackson, Wyoming.
Mrs Suesserman admitted that Mr. McKinstray needed the
services of an attorney to extract from her the location of
the children (Trans. 36).

According to Mr. McKinstray's

understanding she was to therafter supply him with a current
address upon moving (Exhibit 7; Trans. 166-167).
parents were also to be informed (Exhibit 12).

Mr. McKinstray's
Mrs. Suesserman

admitted (Trans. 35) to having never supplied an address other
than the California address from which she was moving and the
post office box number (Trans. 35) which was not her address
at all but was her parents' mailing address (Trans. 38).
Prior·to the children moving with their mother to
California in late 1972 and while the children were still in
Jackson, Mr. McKinstray called the McGuire home (the maternal
grandparents) and visited with the children there (Trans. 10,
44).

Visitation had come to be required of the Appellant to

be~,at

the paternal grandparents' home (Trans. 179).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Sometime before Easter, 1973, Mr. McKinstray and his
second wife, Margie, moved to Worland, Wyoming, about 200 to
250 miles from Jackson. (Trans. 80).

The move was necessitated

by the removal of his employer from Jackson;. .to Worland (Trans.
1

87).

He began working as a long-haul over-the-road truck

driver there and has lived in Worland to the present (Trans.
80).

In spite of the necessity of taking two days off of

work to visit his children for a few hours in Jackson (Trans.
161) Mr. McKinstray, having recently paid just over $1,000
to bring his child support up to date, or nearly so, went with
his wife to Jackson to visit the children just before Easter
of 1973 (Trans. 161; Exhibits 1-3).

From Jackson he telephoned

his ex-wife Nadine to request a visit with his children.
Nadine claims not to recall the telephone call (Trans.

33~)

but Mr. McKinstray testified that she told him that she didn't
think that it was a good idea for him to visit the children
(Trans. 161).

Mr. McKinstray then went to their school to

visit them and give them Easter baskets (Trans. 161-162, 110).
That visit turned out to be the last visit Mr. McKinstray had
with the children prior to the hearing of the present action
(Trans. 14).

In september, 1973, Mrs. Suesserman and the

children moved to Denver, Colorado, for ten months, from which
they moved to St. Louis, Missouri, where they lived for the
five years prior to their move to Salt Lake City in October,
1979 (Trans. 20).

The children were said to have spent summers

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in Jackson in 1973, '74, '75, '76, and '77 with their
maternal grandparents, the McGuires (Trans. 21) but neither
Nadine Suesserman (Trans. 37) nor her mother, Nadine McGuire
(Trans. 21, 49-50) ever notified Mr. McKinstray nor the other
members of the McKinstray family that the children made summer
visits to 1 :Jackson (re father, Trans. 163; grandmother, 135-136;
uncle, 100) nor did they have any independant knowledge of the
summer visits.

In all those sununers while the children were

growing and developing, Peter from age 5 through 10 and Melody
from age 6 through 11, when Mrs. McGuire had the children
living with her, she did not stop at the McKinstray family home
for any reason (Trans. 50), never contacted the McKinstrays
regarding the children being in town (Trans. 49-50, 100/ 135136), didn't stop for visits for the children when they
claimed to have seen the McKinstray family members (Trans. 53),
nor even talk with any McKinstray family members (Trans. 53).
Neither Dale, the Appellant herein, nor any McKinstray family
member was informed of the Mcuire family move to Montana in
1978 (Trans. 53).

Nadine's remarriage, to Mr. Suesserman, in

1975 (Trans. 5) was not mentioned to the McKinstrays (Trans. 53)
and Mr. McKinstray did not learn of his ex-wii.fe 's new married
name "Suesserman" until the service of the pleadings in this
case upon him (Trans. 164) in October, 1979 (R. 13).

There

was no mention to any McKinstray of the children being in
Jackson in the sununer of 1978, even though they were there
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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periodically in moving the McGuires to Montana during that
summer (Trans. 21-22).

The McKinstray family home has been

at the same address for 36 years (Trans. 124), which was
known to the McGuire family (Trans. 34,.43) and which was
driven past on occasion by the McGuires (Trans. 45).

Yet the

McGuires, the custodial family of the children, failed and
refused over those many years to take any minimal steps whatever to inform the KcKinstrays or Dale McKinstray of the
presence of the children so that visitation could take place.
This was all in keeping with an antagonistic attitude held on
the part of Mrs. McGuire, the maternal grandmother.

She had

a dislike of Dale McKinstray because "he got her pregnant,"
~.1dn'

t want Nadine to marry Dale nor indeed to have anything

to do with him (Trans. 51).
Gladys McKinstray, the paternal grandmother, last had
visitation with the children in November, 1972 (Trans. 126).
It was the last.visit because of an incident (Trans. 133-135)
involving Mrs. McGuire and the children's visit to the McKinstray home.

That afternoon when the time came for the children

to return to the McGuire residence Melody did not want to go
and wanted to and did call Mrs. McGuire on the telephone to ask
to stay longer.

Melody was heard by Mrs. McKinstray to say

over the telephone "I hate you".

Mrs;. McKinstray picked up

the telephone to be told by Mrs. McGuire, "Gladys, you're
trying to turn those kids against me and I'm coming after them,"
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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which she did.

Mrs. McGuire's treatment of the children upon

her arrival to pick them up from the McKinstray residence was
such that Mrs. McKinstray resolved to "not put those little
kids through that any more."

(At this time Melody would have

been 5 years old and Peter 4.)

The next month when Mrs.

McKinstray had Christmas gifts for the

chi~dren

(Exhibits 15,

16, 17 and 18, which were on the court's motion returned to
Mrs. McKinstray at the conclusion of the trial, Trans. 180)
she did not know where to send them (Trans. 127).

The children

were in fact in Ontario, California with their mother (Trans. 9)
which was the time when Mrs. Suesserman referred to in admitting
that Mr. McKinstray had to use an attorney to get the address
of the children (Trans. 36) and which address was received by
Dale McKinstray (Exhibit 7) and his by his parents (Exhibit 12)
sometime in February, 1973, as mentioned above.

Again in 1973

Mrs. McKinstray had Christmas gifts for the children but did
not know where to sent them (Trans. 127).

At this time the

children were living in Denver (Trans. 20) without the McKinstrays or any of them having been informed.
Mr. McKinstray sought counsel in late 1972 and early

1973 as to what he should do regarding Nadine and his problems
in visiting the children, even after having paid over $1,000
in child support, and was advised by his attorney to wait
for Nadine to calm down and to let more time go by before he
did anything (Trans. 166).

This was three years after the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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an attorney to get an address that was to be current for
only a brief period.

Shortly thereafter, at Easter in 1973,

Mr. McKinstray did try again to visit but was rebuffed and he
then sought out the children at their school.

He believed

after seeing that time, however, that it would be in their
best interests not to contact them

~{Trans.

171} becausE!:! of

the hostility of the maternal family (Trans. 177). - He believed
also that after they moved from Jackson, which he had heard
abobt after the Easter visit (Trans. 176) his ex-wife would
not tell him where the children were even if he paid his
child support obligations up to date (Trans. 168), which was a
reasonable belief given his recent experience of paying and
still having to resort to an attorney for an address, even
though that address was temporary.

During the entire period

from 1970 though the date of the trial Mr. McKinstray kept
in force two insurance policies on his life with premiums
of $136 per year paid up;to date with the children as the
sole beneficiaries (Trans.
1970 (Trans. 166).

159~

Exh£bits 9, 10 & 11) since

Mr. McKinstray testified that he never

in the time since seeing his children had an intent to
~elinquish

his responsibilites regarding the children nor to

give up any rights (Trans. 171) and wants to establish a
parental relationship with the children (Trans. 171).
The evidence shows that Nadine and the McGuire family
knew of how to get in touch with Dale McKinstray and further
Sponsored
by the S.J.
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Law Library. Funding for digitization
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Worland.

Dale had come from Worland to Jackson for the Easter

1973 visit, Melody had earlier called their Worland telephone
number (Trans. 119) and the Summons and Complaint were served
personally·upon Mr. McKinstray at his home in Worland (R. 12;
Trans. 168).

Upon being served Mr. McKinstray contacted the

attorney for his ex-wife and told him that he wanted to talk
with his children (Trans. 169-170).
Of great significance are Mr. McKinstrays personality
traits of being quiet and reserved, a person who kept his
troubles to himself (Trans. 108, 111, 124) and
for his lack of contact with his children.

w~o

grieved

Mr. McKinstray

becomes particularly quiet and withdrawn on Melody's and
Peter's birthdays and on children-oriented holidays, such as
Easter, Christmas and Halloween (Trans. 111-112).

He is so

because he misses his children (Trans. 123) and has done so
every year 'til now (Trans. 121) as testified to by the members
of his family, his wife, his brother, his mother, and wants to
"see his kids" (.Trans. 107).

He even withdraws when he drives

past the street the McGuires and his children lived on (Trans.
121).

Mr. McKinstray's wife testified that Dale told her

sometime not long after the 1973 Easter visit that he didn't
want to have any more children because he didn't want to risk
the pain and agony of not having his children (Trans. 117-118),
of losing them as well.
Upon learning of his children's whereabouts with the
Sponsored by the
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gifts to his children (Trans. 22) which were refused by the
Suessermans as was the child support payment of December, 1979
(Exhibit 19).

Nadine had several years ago told Dale that

she did not want support money (Trans. 165) and Dale had also
heard that the children had already been adopted (Trans. 144)
several years ago.
Shirley Baldwin is a mutual acquaintance of Dale and
Nadine.

She was referred to in testimony by witnesses as

being one who occasionally knew about the children (Trans. 104,
106, 127) and could tell McKinstrays about them.

The Appellant

made diligent inquiry as to her whereabouts prior to the time
of trial.

She was located in Cornville, Arizona, several

weeks after the conclusion of the
dated April 16, 1980, p.4).

t~ial

(Transcript of Hearing

The substance of her testimony

was unknown until counsel for Appellant spoke with her by
telephone after the trial's conclusion which was to the effect
that Nadine had spoken with her, Shirley Baldwin, and told her
that Dale would never see the children, was angry that D.ale
had paid up the back child support at the end of 1972 because
here expressed intention was to get Dale so far in arrears in
child support ana that she would not let him see the children
and thus have a gradual abandonment (Transcript of Hearing, p.
4).

Counsel for Appellant offered to submit supporting

affidavits regarding the above matters and the others referred
to in

argume~ts

to the court, especially regarding Nadine's

representations
that
Dale
nor
McKinstray
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law
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see the children again, but was not required by the court to
do so.

The court ruled against the taking of the said additional

testimony.

Appellant also sought Findings by the court regarding

credibility of witnesses.

All of Appellant's requests to the

court were denied.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THIS MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL

COURT FOR THE-TAKING OF ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY OF SHIRLEY BALDWIN.

Appellant offered to

p~ovide

the court with his

supporting affidavit regarding the newly discovered evidence
in the form of testimony from Shit.ley Baldwin.

The Appellant

showed or offered to show that the evidence was discovered
since the ttial, that Appellant exercised due diligence in
seeking it out prior to the trial but did not discover the
evidence before the trial, that the evidence was material to
the issues of the Appellant's defenses to the Complaint and
Petition and was such that it probably would have changed the
result of the trial.

As stated in the facts, the testimony

was of a specific plan on the part of Nadine Suesserman of
hindrance to the Appellant in exercising his parental rights
from an early date.

The witness was willing to travel from

Arizona to Salt Lake City should the court have allowed her
testimony.

In a trial wherein the standard of proof is "clear

and convincing evidence" and where that burden has been held
to have
been
in Law
a Library.
matter
so
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theof Museum
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all parental rights and the elements necessary for the
taking of additional testimony have been met, it is incumbent
upon the oourt to hear additional evidence, especially where
as here the testimony will be from a disinterested witness.
This case should be remanded forthe taking of the proffered
additional testimony.
POINT II.

THIS MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL

COURT FOR\ THE MAKING OF ADDITIONAL FINDINGS REGARDING THE
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES OR OF OBVIATING THE NECESSITY THEREFORE.
This point is concededly a novel one and one which
Appellant recognizes may be without merit.

No case law has

been found in support of it and, indeed, it seems many cases
have treated it by implication.

Nevertheless, the Constitution

of Utah, Article VIII, Section 9, states "In equity cases the
appeal may be on questions of both law and fact ..•. "

This being

an equity case the reviewing court will give consideration to
the findings of fact of the trial court and will not disturb
those findings unless it appears that the trial judge made
findings against the weight of the evidence.

Peterson v.

Peterson, 112 U. 554, 190 P.2d 135.
The credibility or lack thereof of the witnesses is an
issue necessarily precedent to the finding of facts based upon
the testimony of witnesses.
requ~sted

The court below was specifically

to make findings regarding the credibility of witnesses ·

(Transcript
of Hearing,
April
16,
1980,
pp.of Museum
5-6).
While
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
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present case is reviewable on the facts and the law, its
review is circumscribed by the traditional rules regarding the
review of evidence, e.g., that the reviewing court will not
disturb findings unless it appears that the trial judge made
findings against the weight of the evidence, or, for another
example, the reviewing court will assume that the trial court
believed those aspects of the evidence which support its
findings and judgment, Robertson v. Hutchison, 560 P.2d 1110
(Utah 19 77) .
The foregoing examples are different standards for
reviewing evidence in seeming to require different quanta
for the reversal or modification of a lower court decision.
In cases up for review wherein the degree of proof required
at trial is a mere preponderance of the evidence there is a
substantial leeway built in to the trial court's

ev~dence

weighing and decision-making such that broad discretion is
granted and few, if any, judgment reversals will be made,
regardless of the merits of the losing party!s case.

In cases

wherein the degree of proof is more stringent, however, such
as by "clear and convincing" evidence, there is much less
leeway or discretion in the evidence-weighing and decisionmaking discretion of the trial court in which it may take
refuge.

The present matter seems to be such a case.

The

degree of proof required is "clear and convincing" evidence
R>bertson v.

Hutchison~_S~Er~,

at 1112.

The elements which
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seem to be subject to differing standards of proof.

It seems

to Appellant that where a more stringent standard of proof is
required the decision should be subject to a more stringent
standard of proof.

This indeed is the case when comparing

criminal case review with civil case review in general.

But

this court in Robertson adopted for that case a rather lax
standard for review, that of assuming that the trial court
believed those aspects of the evidence which support the
findings.

While it appears that a lax standard for review

is not appropriate for a case with a stringent standard for
trial proof, in the present case we should

ourselves

concern

with a situation where there is a stringent standard of trial
proof and a specific request for specific findings
the credibility of
findings 0f fact.

~witnesses,

regarding

the very foundation for the

It appears that inconsonant standards for

trial and for review is a denial of due process of law in
violation of the Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7,
and .o& the Coitist_itution of the United States, Amendment XIV,
Section 1, and further-of the equal protection of laws guaranteed by the Consitution of Utah, Afticle I, Section 7, and
of the Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV,
Section I.

Without a consistent application of review

standards consonant with trial standards arbitrariness tends
to enter the review process, or at least there may not be a
rational relationship between the standards of trial and the
Sponsored by the S.J.
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less than just.

Without findings regarding credibility in

a case such as this one does not know whether one lost on the
facts or on the law, and if on the facts upon which facts.
Given the high standard at trial required and the great
personal loss to an individual deprived of his parental rights
it appears that the standards

for

findings~

review, should be stringent when requested.

and hence for
Surely little

administrative burden is added and a step nearer ideal or
true justice will be taken.

This court should

remand to the

trial court for the entry of findings on credibility of the
witnesses or other findings obviating the necessity thereof
such as by the finding of specific facts supporting each
element 06 the prevailing party's required proofs.
POINT III.

THE EViIDENCE UNDER APPLICABLE STATUTORY

AND CASE LAW WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT OF THE
TRIAL COURT AND THE JUDGMENT SHOULD THEREFORE BE REVERSED.
A. Statutory Law:
The applicable Utah Code provision under which the
petitioner sought to have a declaration of abandonment is
Section-78-30-5, which states as follows;
Consent unnecessary where parent failed to support
or communicate with child.-The child may be adopted without;the consent of the
parent or parents, when the district court in which
the proceedings are pending determines, after notice
to such parent or parents in a manner determined by
the court, that the parent or parents, having the
ability and duty to do so, have not provided support
and have made no effort or only token effort without
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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effort has been made if the parent or parents have
failed to support and communicate with the child
for a period of one year or longer.
The Utah legislature has set out several elements to
be shown in order to find that a parnet has "abandoned" his
child in such a manner as would allow an adoption to be made
over his objection.

For illustrative purposes these are set

forth below in separately numbered elements.
A ch.iild may be adopted without the consent of the parent

a.

when the district court in which the proceedings
are pending determines

b.

after notice to such parent or parents

c.

in a manner determined by the court

d.

that the parent having the ability to provide
support, and

e.

having the duty to provide support

f.

has not provided support

g.

and has made no effort or only token effort

h.

without good cause

i.

to maintain a parental relationship with the child.

This Supreme Court has been called on in the past to
review cases such as this and has added further criteria which

must be met in order for a parent to be deemed to have "abandoned'I
his child.

In a unanimous opinion this court in upholding a

finding of no abandonment applied
j.

the following considerations:

It is and should be the policy of the law to support
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preservation of the parent child relationship
and by being reluctant to interfere with or
destroy it.
The court will find an abandonment
k.

only when the evidence is clear and convincing

1.

that the parent has either expressed an intention

m.

or so conducted himself

n.

,as to clearly indicate

o.

an intention

p.

to relinquish parental rights

q.

and reject parental responsibilities of his child

Subsequent to the Robertson case this court in another
unanimous decision affirmed the Robertson case stating that
It is nevertheless necessary that it be
show.n that there was an intent coupled
with acts or conduct constituting a
desertion or an abandonment. Hall v. Anderson,
562 P.2d 1250 at 1251.
(Emphasis added)
In Robertson and Hall this court also reviews the
r.

best interests of the child (Robertson at 1113;
Hall at 1251)

In these cases the Court looked at the interests of the
children and in them found that the children were loved,
wanted, and well-cared-for in their living circumstances and
determined that the "only thing actually involved is the
technical legal status as to [the child} and the proposed
adoption is mostly a matter of the psychological affect because
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the court found that the failure to find an abandonment by
the parent "does not involve any actual 'disruption' of the
child living in or here adjustment in that home.

As we stated

in the Roberson case, supra:
[s.] We do not see any likelihood that there will!be
a change of custody or any substantial interference
with the desireable circumstances in which she is
living.

Hall at 1251.

In the present case we have before the court a situation
where the parties resided in Jackson, Wyoming, and became
divoxced.

The father's work took bim to a new residence 200

miles away in Wyoming while the mother took the children to
California, Colorado, Missouri and Utah, the last three without
the

~nowledg~

of the father until well after the fact.

The

children were apparently in Wyoming for several summers but
that fact was not known to the father nor the members of his
family, although they could have easily been apprised of that
fact by the custodial family.

The father was not allowed to

visit with his children unless child support were paid, and then
in the later days only at the house of the maternal grandmother,
who admitted antipathy towards the father, and still later after
support was paid still no visitation was cooperated in nor
addresses of the children provided.

The father had been

wagin~

a losing battle against the mother and her family by the time
the mother and children moved out of the state.

The father had
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down, a time three years after the divorce.

The question

in this case comes down to How much does a father have to bear
in his relationship to his children; is the mother to be rewarded
for her wrongful behaviour and the father punished for caring for
the children enough to back away and avoid conflicts in their
lives, a man who believed it in their best interests not to
contact them it would raise with their mother?

It seems that

a prima facia case for "good cause" (item# 'h', supra) has
been made and that the burden and presumption, should then shift
back t.o the: petitioners to show abandonment.

Even if the burden

or presumption does not shift back, the Appellant nevertheless
has no'b "clearly indicated" (item# 'n') an "intention" (item
# 'o') to "relinquish parental rights" (item# 'p'), etc.
The only evidence regarding the "best interests of the
children" (item# 'r') was from the prospective adopting father
who testified that although married to the children's mother in
1975 (Trans•.: 5) . he had_; 1ived ·in the same home as the children
since 1973 (Trans. 95) and thau he loves the children, intends
to care for them and that his relationship with the children
will not be changed should an adoption not be granted (Trans. 96),
a circumstance similar to the Robertson and Hall cases.

There

was not a clear and convincing proof made as to the elements
necessary as set forth in the statute and the cited cases.
- -:. - - - Otlier elements wherein Appellant sees a less-than-sufficient
quantum, particularly in light of the uncontradicted nature of
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e.

duty to privide support--Nadine told the
Appellant that she did not want child support
and Appellant may not therefore be held to as
high a standard as would otherwise obtain, even
if he did in fact have a continuing obligation.
Under the law ("Ignorance of the law is no
excusen) the Appellant may have had a continuing
duty but his attempts at visitation became frustrated
and had precious little recognizable leverage to
use in maintaining his parental relationship.

f.

has not provided support--Throughout these many
years Appellant paid insurance premiums in behalf
of the children as beneficiaries in spite of having
remarr~ed

and thus with a new wife to support.

His attempts at visitation were frustrated arid he
had reasonable cause to believe that Nadine and
family were guilty of bad faith in their dealings
with him regarding the children and his family.
g .. has made no effort or only token effort--To the
extent Appellant's efforts were token or nonexistent, they were a result of difficulties between
Appellant and his former wife and her family and
which Appellant wanted to protect his children from.
Appellant relied upon the counsel of his attorney
to give Nadine time, which, as it turned out with
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Appellant Dale McKinstray respectfully submits that
he is entitled to have his family ties to his children
strengthened rather than destroyed, that his rights of visitation
and responsibilities as he may have,

be confirmed and that

he be declared not to have abandoned his children.

____.

Respectfully submitted this

~-

day of September, 1980.
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